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DISQUALIFICATION OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE
ATTORNEYS DUE TO PRIOR GOVERNMENT SERVICE
MARGO L. FRASIER

I. INTRODUCTION
"A lawyer shall not accept private employment in a matter in
which he had substantial responsibility while he was a public employee."' The twenty-two words of this disciplinary rule2 do not
seem difficult to understand, but they have prompted much commentary about attorneys who leave the employment of regulators
to become counsel for those who are regulated. s
This comment is not about the attorney who works for one of
the large federal agencies in Washington, D.C. and then becomes
an associate with a large law firm. Rather, it is about the attorney
who works for a prosecutor's office and then resigns to practice
criminal defense law, particularly as a solo practitioner or in a
small firm.4
At the outset, it is crucial to recognize that the former prosecutor does not pursue his profession in a vacuum. His decision to
practice criminal defense law affects the accused, who places his
freedom in the attorney's hands; the prosecutor, who is determined
to prevent the accused from gaining an unfair advantage; the public, which is anxious to have faith in the criminal justice system;
and, ultimately, the trial judge, who must balance these competing
interests while trying to observe the edicts of the American Bar
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 9-101(B) (1979).
The American Bar Association's (ABA) MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
is divided into Canons, Ethical Considerations, and Disciplinary Rules. Canons are "statements of axiomatic norms expressing in general terms the standards of professional conduct
expected of lawyers." Ethical Considerations are more specific objectives which are "aspirational in character." Disciplinary Rules are mandatory and "state the minimum level of
conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being subject to disciplinary action." MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSBILrrY Preamble and Preliminary Statement (1979).
3. See, e.g., Proceedings of the National Conference on Federal Regulation: Roads to
Reform, The "Revolving Door"-Should It Be Stopped?, 32 AD. L. REV. 383 (1980); Morgan,
Appropriate Limits on Participationby a Former Agency Official in Matters Before an
Agency, 1980 DuKE L.J. 1; Mundheim, Conflict of Interest and the Former Government
Employee: Rethinking the Revolving Door, 14 CREIGHTON L. REv. 707 (1981); Snider,
Switching Sides: The Problems of Public Lawyers Going Private, 3 L.A. LAw., Feb. 1981, at
18; Note, Attorney Disqualificationand the Former GovernmentalEmployee, 47 BROOKLYN
L. REV. 979 (1981); Comment, Disqualificationof Counsel: Adverse Interests and Revolving
Doors, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 199 (1981); Note, Armstrong v. McAlpin: Screening Former Government Attorneys, 2 PACE L. REv. 49 (1982).
4. Citations to cases involving civil suits and alternate fact patterns are included for
their value in clarifying this situation. See, e.g., infra notes 35 & 58 and accompanying text.
1.

2.
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Association's Model Code of Professional Responsibility.' It is the
judge's special duty to ensure that the "trial is conducted with so-

licitude for the essential rights of the accused." '
II.

THE CODE'S ROLE IN DISQUALIFICATION

Currently, courts rely heavily on Disciplinary Rule 9-101(B) 7 and
Canon 91 of the Code for guidance when the issue of disqualification arises. The ABA Code is not a statute, but "[a]s the legal profession's own source of ethical standards, the Code carries great
weight in a court's examination of an attorney's conduct before
it."9 Moreover, many states have given the Code the force of law
by statutory adoption.
Illustrative of this point is the status of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which were adopted by the ABA House of Delegates in August 1983. These rules were adopted as a revision of the
Code, but until the state supreme courts or state bar associations
adopt the revision or courts build a body of case law upon it, these
Model Rules have no authority.
A.

Disciplinary Rule 9-101(B)

One court stated that "[t]he ethical requirement that an attorney who has been a public employee may not, upon retirement, act
on behalf of a private client in any matter upon which he was engaged in the public interest is neither new, ambiguous nor difficult
to understand."10 However, that opinion is not shared universally.
In fact, even the ABA Commission on Ethics and Professional Responsibility acknowledged the difficulty of setting forth concrete
meanings for the two main components of the rule." The Commission stated, "Although a precise definition of 'matter' as used in
the disciplinary rule is difficult to formulate, the term seems to
contemplate a discrete and isolatable transaction or set of transac5. Hereinafter cited as the CODE.
6. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 71 (1942).
7. See supra text accompanying note 1.
8. "A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appearance of Professional Impropriety," CODE
Canon 9 (1979).
9. Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 810 (5th Cir. 1976).
10. In re Biederman, 307 A.2d 595, 597 (N.J. 1973) (attorney reprimanded for writing
letters and participating in reinstatement proceedings as general counsel for corporation
against whom he had instituted proceedings as deputy attorney general).
11. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 342 (1975), reprinted in 62 A.B.A.J. 517 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Formal Op. 342].
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tions between identifiable parties.'

2

Also, the "substantial respon-

sibility" element was recognized as being the "most difficult to interpret in light of the underlying considerations, pro and con."18
New Jersey is exemplary of those states that adopt a highly restrictive approach to disqualification. That jurisdiction recognizes
tiers of authority, each having correlative limitations. The prosecutor, as opposed to one of his assistants, who goes into defense work
is disqualified from representing anyone in any criminal matter
that was pending in the office while he was a prosecutor.
"[R]esponsibility, whether exercised or not, over the subject matter is automatically disenabling.""' The first assistant prosecutor,
because of his status, is presumed to have shared this fatal responsibility over pending matters." Furthermore, if there is actual
sharing of responsibility with other assistant prosecutors, those assistants are likewise disqualified.'"
Irrespective of his level of authority and responsibility, a former
prosecutor is disqualified if he participated in the investigation,
even if his participation was not of a substantial nature. 7 "[Any
actual knowledge of facts obtained by virtue of the office"' 8 or any
consciousness of "information or material on a matter pending in
the prosecutor's office"' 9 warrants disqualification.
The New Jersey Supreme Court also has indicated that the likelihood of disqualification is much greater when a prosecutor's office
has a small number of attorneys than when it has a large staff.
That assumption is based on the belief that the "possibility of
sharing in resolution of problems-legal, factual, and investigative-are undoubtedly greater when there are but a few assistant
prosecutors."20 Under the New Jersey policy, it would be difficult
for a former prosecutor to practice criminal defense law in the
same jurisdiction for a substantial period of time. But New
Jersey's approach is, self-admittedly, more restrictive than that
contemplated by the ABA."'
12.
13.
14.
1978).
15.
16.

Id. in 62 A.B.A.J. at 519 (footnote omitted).
Id.
In re Advisory Opinion on Professional Ethics No. 361, 390 A.2d 118, 120 (N.J.
Id. at 120-21.
Id. at 120.

17. Id.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id.
Id. at 121.
Id. at 121 n.3.
Id. at 121.
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The ABA's test as set out in Opinion 342 is whether "the lawyer

had 'substantial responsibility' in regard to the matter in question,
rather than whether he possessed certain knowledge." 22 The ABA
views substantial responsibility as envisaging a "much closer and
more direct relationship than that of a mere perfunctory approval
or disapproval of the matter in question."23 In order for an attorney to fall under this rule he must have been "personally involved
to an important, material degree in the investigative or delibera24
'
tive processes regarding the transactions or facts in question. "
Even being the chief prosecutor in a large office does not ipso facto
give the government employee the substantial responsibility contemplated by the rule "in regard to all the minutiae of facts lodged
'25
within that office."

Recognizing that increasing the scope of DR 9-101(B) could possibly be detrimental to governmental recruiting, the ABA did not
intend to encompass "official responsibility" within the definition
of "substantial responsibility. 26 Still, it is possible for an attorney
to be subject to the restraints of DR 9-101(B), without a showing
of actual personal or substantial involvement, if he had "such a
heavy responsibility for the matter in question that it is unlikely
he did not become personally and substantially involved in the in2' 7
vestigative or deliberative processes regarding that matter.
By requiring the party who is moving for disqualification to
demonstrate only that it is unlikely that the attorney was not involved to the degree contemplated by DR 9-101(B), the ABA acknowledged that proving actual involvement or receipt of confidential information is often difficult. 28 Moreover, if proof of actual

receipt of confidential information were required, the challenging
party might be forced to choose between disclosing privileged information in order to support a motion and foregoing the possibility of having the former prosecutor disqualified. 29 This could very
well destroy the confidences Canon 4 seeks to protect. 30
22. Formal Op. 342, n.25, supra note 11, in 62 A.B.A.J. at 520.
23. Formal Op. 342, supra note 11, in 62 A.B.A.J. at 520.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Formal Op. 342, n.29, supra note 11, in 62 A.B.A.J. at 520.
27. Formal Op. 342, supra note 11, in 62 A.B.A.J. at 520.
28. See, e.g., Note, Attorney Disqualification and Access to Work Product: Toward a
Principled Rule, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 1054, 1059 (1978).
29. See,. e.g., Government of India v. Cook Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1978).
30. "A Lawyer Should Preserve the Confidences and Secrets of a Client," CODE Canon 4
(1979).
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An example of a flagrant violation of DR 9-101(B) would be for
the very attorney who secured a conviction against a defendant to
represent him in an attempt to overturn his conviction." It would
likewise be inappropriate for a prosecutor to switch sides if he had
32
been in the grand jury room interviewing witnesses under oath.
There is little question that a former prosecutor would violate DR
9-101(B) if he appeared for both the defense and prosecution in
the same case and attacked an indictment he had drawn up. 3
However, when a conflict is less obvious there is no consensus
among jurisdictions as to whether DR 9-101(B) is violated. Some
jurisdictions disqualify freely. The Federal District Court of Hawaii suggested that signing a complaint is a fatal exercise of substantial responsibility.3 4 The Northern District of Illinois found
that "even the decision that a 'boilerplate' complaint of a particular kind will do an adequate job implicates a legal judgment." 5
In United States v. Kitchin,se the Fifth Circuit upheld the disqualification of a defense attorney whose associate had been actively involved in prosecuting the defendant at an earlier stage in
the same matter while serving as assistant United States attorney.
"For a former prosecutor to be associated with the lawyer who represents a person he earlier helped prosecute, even if only at an embryonic stage, would likely provoke suspicion and distrust of the
37
''
judicial process.

Where charges against the accused were unrelated to the attorney's former duties, the Fourth Circuit found that the "singular
circumstances of having prosecuted a defendant does not disqualify a former government attorney from defending the same
individual. . .

.

31. See In re Biederman, 307 A.2d 595, 597 (N.J. 1973).
32. Morgan, supra note 3, at 37.
33. People v. Spencer, 61 Cal. 128, 130 (1882) (attorney suspended for moving to set
aside indictment for omission of required forms on behalf of defendant when he had prepared the indictment as district attorney).
34. Telos, Inc. v. Hawaiian Tel. Co., 397 F. Supp. 1314, 1316 n.11 (D. Hawaii 1975) (attorney and members of his firm disqualified from participating as plaintiff's counsel where
attorney had filed and participated in similar suit against the defendants while a deputy
attorney general).
35. Kadish v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 548 F. Supp. 1030, 1033 (N.D. Ill.
1982) (attorney who had prepared injunctive complaint to use against commodity brokers
while working for commission disqualified from later representing brokers).
36. 592 F.2d 900 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 843 (1979).
37. Id. at 905.
38. United States v. Smith, 653 F.2d 126, 128 (4th Cir. 1981) (attorney's disqualification
as defense counsel reversed where he had supervised investigation and trial of defendant on
an unrelated charge as assistant United States attorney).
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Some courts have imputed to the head of a government office or
subdivision the "knowledge of the proceedings taken by his juniors. '"" The prudence of disqualifying every prosecutor who
reaches a supervisory level is questionable. Assistants tend to perform their duties with autonomy. The only knowledge the superior
might have of a given case is the name of the accused.
In contrast to this restrictive approach, which seemingly calls for
disqualification based on job titles, is the approach taken by the
Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal in Endress v. Coe.40 The
district court quashed a trial court's disqualification of a former
chief assistant prosecutor whose involvement in the case in question while with the state had been minimal. The court stated:
Absent a showing of participation to any extent in the investigation leading to a criminal charge, or some involvement in the case
itself, or some advantage gained that would work to the disadvantage of the state, a former assistant state attorney [prosecutor]
should not be automatically disqualified from acting as defense
counsel for a defendant investigated or charged during the time
counsel served as an assistant state attorney."'
Although the Fifth Circuit disqualifies where there is a "specifically identifiable" violation of the Ethical Rules,42 that jurisdiction
is also flexible in finding that even actual substantial responsibility
while associated with the government does not always mandate
disqualification.4 3
These decisions based on the underlying circumstances of each
case allow for much-needed flexibility. An unbending rule could
"frequently defeat important social interests including the client's
right to counsel of his choice, the lawyer's right freely to practice
his profession, and the government's need to attract skilled
'44
lawyers.
39. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. 345, 362 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (applying
Canon 36; DR 9-101(B) is based upon former Canon 36, but its standard is different). See
Formal Op. 342, supra note 11, in 62 A.B.A.J. at 519; see also United States v. Ostrer, 597
F.2d 337, 339 (2d Cir. 1979) (former prosecutor disqualified due to his prosecution of two of
the government's witnesses in closely related investigations).
40. 433 So. 2d 1280 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983).
41. Id. at 1281.
42. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37.
43. Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 812 (5th Cir. 1976).
44. Id. (citations omitted).
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B.

Canon 9

Decisions indicate that many courts treat Canon 9"' as the
equivalent of a Disciplinary Rule. Therefore, even if a former prosecutor gets over the substantial responsibility hurdle of DR 9101(B), he may confront a motion to disqualify based on the perceived need to consider "not only the objective propriety of his
conduct, but also the appearance it will present to an independent
observer."" The dividing line between ethical and unethical behavior under Canon 9 is even less clear than it is under DR 9101(B). What creates the "appearance of impropriety" and
whether a trial court can and should disqualify an attorney under
this illusive standard are even more controversial questions than
the issue of what constitutes substantial responsibility.
It is recognized that an attorney may be disqualified even when
there is no actual conflict of interest, 7 if he fails to avoid the appearance of impropriety." A showing of "actual evidence of any
impropriety"4 9 or "proof of actual evil"5 0 is not required. The rationale supporting this view is that the attorney, although not actually in violation of the Code, must stand aside 5 because "courts
should be concerned with the public's confidence in the integrity of
our legal system [and] [tihis concern should not be lightly
'52
ignored.
The alternate approach is a reluctance to disqualify. The courts
that adopt this position still recognize that it is essential that the
public have confidence in the integrity and impartiality of our system of criminal justice, and that the appearance of impropriety
may be as damaging as actual impropriety. This group would re45. See supra note 8.
46. Note, Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession, 94 HARv. L. REV. 1244, 1415
(1981).
47. Note, Attorney Disqualification:The Case for an Irrebuttable Presumption Rebutted, 44 ALB. L. REV. 645, 649-50 (1980).
48. See, e.g., International Business Mach. Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271 (3d Cir. 1978).
49. Andrews v. Allstate Ins. Co., 366 So. 2d 462, 463 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978) (firm disqualified from representing plaintiff because defendants previously had given statements to the
firm thinking the firm would represent the defendants).
50. Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602, 609 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436
U.S. 905 (1978). Weber was overruled on other grounds in In re Multi-Piece Rim Prods.
Liab., 612 F.2d 377, 378 (8th Cir. 1980).
51. State v. Jaquindo, 350 A.2d 252, 256 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.) (Morgan, J., concurring and dissenting in part) (defense attorney disqualified because he had been assistant
city attorney during the investigation of the defendant), afl'd sub nom., State v. Rizzo, 350
A.2d 225 (N.J. 1975).
52. Breger, Ethics Commentary, 47 BROOKLYN L. REV. 961, 970 (1981).
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quire at least a "reasonable" appearance of impropriety."3 A mere
"possibility" of the appearance of impropriety may be insufficient. 54 It is not reasonable to find "an appearance of evil" where
an attorney who once worked for a vast governmental agency undertakes a case against the government." The claim of impropriety
cannot be a "fanciful, unrealistic or purely subjective suspicion."56
Nor will the attorney's conduct be "governed by standards which
5' 7
can be imputed only to the most cynical members of the public.
Disqualification under Canon 9 must be based on articulable principles" so as to prevent it from being "manipulated for strategic
advantage on the account of an impropriety which exists only in
the minds of imaginative lawyers.'' 59
In a civil suit, the Second Circuit went so far as to say that absent a "claim that the trial will be tainted, appearance of impropriety is simply too slender a reed on which to rest a disqualification
order except in the rarest cases."' The court followed the Connecticut Bar Association's recommendation, refusing to allow Canon 9 to be used "promiscuously as a convenient tool for disqualification when the facts simply do not fit within the rubric of other
specific ethical and disciplinary rules."6
Although the Fifth Circuit has at times set a rather rigid standard for disqualification on the basis of substantial responsibility, 2
it stated that "while Canon 9 does imply that there need be no
proof of actual wrongdoing, . . . there must be at least a reasonable possibility that some specifically identifiable impropriety did in
fact occur" 3 and "the likelihood of public suspicion or obloquy
[must outweigh] the social interests which will be served by a lawyer's continued participation in a particular case. '64 By using this
53. Osborn v. District Court, 619 P.2d 41, 47 (Colo. 1980) (supreme court found trial
judge had properly disqualified firm as defense counsel due to associate's involvement in
prosecuting defendant while deputy district attorney; in companion case, court found district judge had acted with "excess of caution" in disqualifying district attorney and staff
because attorney had represented defendant on unrelated charge while in private practice).
54. Endress v. Coe, 433 So. 2d 1280, 1281 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983).
55. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. 345, 364 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
56. United States v. Smith, 653 F.2d 126, 128 (4th Cir. 1981).
57. Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 813 (5th Cir. 1976).
58. In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 658
F.2d 1355, 1361 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 990 (1982).
59. Woods, 537 F.2d at 819.
60. Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1247 (2d Cir. 1979).
61. International Eleca. Corp. v. Flanzer, 527 F.2d 1288, 1295 (2d Cir. 1975).
62. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
63. Woods, 537 F.2d at 813.
64. Id. at 813 n.12.
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two-step approach, the Fifth Circuit ensures that there will be a
consideration of the underlying competing interests before a decision is made.

III.

THE COMPETING INTERESTS

A.

The Defendant's Interest

In civil cases it is usually appropriate to disqualify an attorney
on a conflict of interest claim if it is determined that there was "an
attorney-client relationship between the moving party and opposing counsel which involved matters related to the pending suit." 5
In criminal cases the defendant's sixth amendment rights are implicated and the civil standard is neither appropriate nor
controlling. 6
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
67
right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
Courts agree that a criminal defendant's choice of particular counsel is given protection by the amendment, 68 yet, it is a logical imperative that "[t]here is some point short of allowing a defendant
complete freedom in choosing his own counsel at which the sixth
amendment's prescription is satisfied."69 Courts have interpreted
the amendment to ensure that a defendant is afforded a "fair opportunity to secure counsel of his own choice,"' 0 and that he "may
'71 It
be represented by any counsel who will agree to take his case.
is the "actual choice of the defendant which deserves consideration. 7 2 However, the defendant's choice must be balanced against
and may be overridden by the need to preserve the highest standards of professional conduct."
In attempting to strike such a balance, New Jersey has taken the
stance that while the defendant has a right to retain qualified
65.
66.

See, e.g., DeArce v. State, 405 So. 2d 283, 284 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
United States v. Armedo-Sarmiento, 524 F.2d 591, 593 (2d Cir. 1975).
67. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
68. United States v. Dinitz, 538 F.2d 1214, 1219 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1104 (1977).
69. Id.
70. United States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 489 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932)), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1069 (1979).
71. United States v. Cunningham, 672 F.2d 1064, 1070 (2d Cir. 1982).
72. United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 358 (7th Cir. 1972).
73. Davis v. Stamler, 494 F. Supp. 339, 343-44 (D.N.J. 1980), afl'd, 650 F.2d 477 (3d Cir.
1981).
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counsel of his choice, he has no corresponding right to be represented by counsel disqualified because of an ethical requirement. 7
The Third Circuit's view is that the defendant is only protected
from an "arbitrary dismissal" of his chosen counsel in cases where
there is a possibility of conflict due to the joint representation of
defendants. 70 Nevertheless, the Third Circuit, in a case involving
disqualification of counsel due to a conflict between the defense
attorney and the trial judge, recognized that because all attorneys
are not alike, the defendant's selection of a particular attorney
"becomes critical to the type of defense he will make. 7' 6 The court
also noted that by allowing a defendant to select his own counsel
the "intimacy and confidentiality which are important to an effec'77
tive attorney-client relationship can be nurtured.
Correspondingly, most courts agree that the defendant's choice
should be honored absent a "showing that some important interest
will be adversely affected by permitting chosen counsel to proceed," ' or that there is a "serious risk of undermining public confidence in the integrity of our legal system. '79 A highly speculative
conflict of interest is not enough; it must be very likely to
80
materialize.
The ABA cautions against allowing DR 9-101(B) to become a
"mere tool" by which one party could improve its chances of success by depriving the other of competent counsel."' Courts need to
be cognizant of the "reality that the motion to disqualify counsel is
an effective litigation tactic that can . . ., if successful, deprive [a
8' 2
defendant] of his chosen and well-prepared attorney.
B.

The Prosecutor'sInterest

When a prosecutor moves across the aisle to the defense table,
74. State v. Lucarello, 343 A.2d 465, 468 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.) (attorney's disqualification as defense counsel affirmed where he had participated in the investigation of the
defendant while assistant prosecutor), aff'd, 350 A.2d 226 (N.J. 1975).
75. United States v. Flanagan, 679 F.2d 1072, 1075 (3d Cir. 1982) (appeal pending).
76. United States v. Laura, 607 F.2d 52, 56 (3d Cir. 1979).
77. Id. at 57.
78. See United States v. Phillips, 699 F.2d 798, 801-02 (6th Cir. 1983).
79. See United States v. Hobson, 672 F.2d 825, 828 (11th Cir.) (criminal defense attorney disqualified due to suspicion of involvement in the crime), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 208
(1982).
80. Flanagan,679 F.2d at 1076.
81. Formal Op. 342, supra note 11, in 62 A.B.A.J. at 578.
82. Note, Attorney Disqualification-PerSe Rule Requiring Disqualificationof Attorneys Concurrently Representing Adverse Interests of Sister Corporations Rejected, 27
WAYNE L. REV. 1619, 1621 (1981).
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there is a question raised as to what information he has taken with
him. The danger of confidential information acquired from a former client being used to that client's disadvantage has required
disqualification in civil cases without a prerequisite showing of actual receipt of the information. 3 A showing of access to the substantially related material is enough.8 4 This standard has been applied in both criminal" and civil 6 cases where the former client
was the government.
Although a former prosecutor may have had access to information that would be deemed "confidential" in a subsequent civil action, the same problem may not be present in a criminal case. In
Brady v. Maryland,"'the United States Supreme Court recognized
a due process requirement that the prosecution disclose requested
evidence favorable to the defendant on the issue of guilt or punishment.88 Although Brady may minimize the possibility of unfair advantage to a defendant, its impact is limited by the Supreme
Court's holding that the information be requested by the defendant and, moreover, that it be favorable to him. Also, a former
prosecutor may have had access to information that did not become part of the prosecution's files but could be used to discredit
opposing witnesses. 8
In addition to the Brady disclosure rule, discovery rules also
may alleviate a possible unfair advantage to the defendant. Although federal courts and most state courts do not have formal
discovery in criminal cases, Florida allows extensive discovery. 0
But even in Florida and other discovery states, there are advantages that can be gained by the former prosecutor's access to the
files within the prosecutor's office. For example, in Florida, the
work product of the prosecutor,91 the identity of a confidential informant, 92 and, generally, police reports 3 are not available to de83. Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 571 (2d Cir. 1973).
84. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. 345, 354 n.11 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
85. United States v. Uzzi, 549 F. Supp. 979, 982 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (entire criminal defense
firm disqualified due to associate's involvement in investigation while assistant United
States attorney).
86. United States v. Trafficante, 328 F.2d 117, 120 (5th Cir. 1964) (defendant's attorney
in tax lien proceeding disqualified because he had worked on the case while with the Internal Revenue Service; court referred to Canon 36).
87. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
88. Id. at 87.
89. United States v. Ostrer, 597 F.2d 337, 340 (2d Cir. 1979).
90. FLA. R. CraIM. P. 3.220.
91. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(c)(1).

92.

FLA.

R.

CraIM.

P. 3.220(c)(2).
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fense counsel through the formal discovery process. However, a
former prosecutor may have gained access to this information during his prior government service.
There is also a possibility that the former prosecutor might have
interviewed witnesses and victims and, thereby, established a rapport that would give his client an advantage during cross-examination that other criminal defendants do not enjoy. The prosecutor's
office also has access to information in which private parties have a
reasonable expectation of privacy. Misuse of these resources must
be prevented. 4
An even graver danger is the possibility that the prosecutor
would improperly fail to remedy a weakness he discovered in an
information, probable cause affidavit, or indictment in hopes of exploiting the defect at a subsequent trial. While this possibility is
remote, its occurrence would be extremely damaging to the legitimacy of the prosecutor's office in the eyes of the public.
C.

The Former Prosecutor'sInterests

As one commentator noted, "If most government lawyers stayed
forever on their side of the courtroom, as many do in England,
conflicts of interest surrounding their cases would hardly be the
headline it is today."9' 5 But in the United States, switching sides is
the rule rather than the exception. Although prosecutors' offices
encourage some to make a career of government service, they benefit from the infusion of new ideas that comes with turnover at

lower levels.96
[T]he revolving door is an important aid to government recruitment of attorneys with talent and imagination. The main advantages that government agencies have to offer young attorneys are
training and experience, both of which can be turned into
financial gain when and if the attorney chooses to leave the
government."
The danger implicit in disturbing this quid pro quo has been
widely recognized. If the former prosecutor's employment opportu93. Breedlove v. State, 413 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1982) (police reports generally not discoverable per se as statements of the officers who made them).
94. Note, supra note 46, at 1432 n.79.
95. Snider, supra note 3, at 20.
96. Note, supra note 46, at 1429 n.63.
97. Id. at 1430 (footnote omitted).
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nities are severely restricted, he may be understandably reluctant
to serve9 or be deterred from accepting government employment. 9
Severe limitations may force many to avoid government service totally."' 0 If the experience gained is less valuable, government service will become a less attractive opportunity. 10 '
In spite of these dangers, some states adhere to a restrictive approach to the "revolving door." New Jersey, for example, prohibits
an assistant county prosecutor from appearing "in any criminal
matter in any capacity against the State in the county in which he
served for a period of six months from the date of termination of
his public employment.' 0 2 This restriction applies even if the attorney is not otherwise disqualified.10 3
A more sensitive approach would require independent grounds
for disqualification of the attorney. Criminal law is a specialty. If
the former prosecutor is prevented "from engaging in [the] practice of the very specialty for which the government sought his service . . . the sacrifices of entering
government service will be too
04
make.'
to
men
most
for
great
D.

The Public's Interest

Public trust in the administration of justice is a concern of all of
those involved in the legal system. Public trust in the legal profession is even more crucial "in a case involving the public's interest
in the prosecution of alleged criminal acts as opposed to civil litigation."'10 This is because the public is most concerned "when the
public itself, rather than a private party, is suffering the consequences"' 1 6 of any potential misuse of information or power by a
former or present government attorney.
In some situations the threat to public confidence is apparent.
Public trust undoubtedly would be undermined if the same attorney played the role of prosecutor at the first trial and defense
98. Mundheim, supra note 3, at 708.
99. Kesselhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 791, 793-94 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
100. Snider, supra note 3, at 24.
101. Morgan, supra note 3, at 53.
102. In re Advisory Opinion on Professional Ethics No. 361, 390 A.2d 118, 121 (N.J.
1978).

103. Id.
104. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. 345, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
105. United States v. Kitchin, 592 F.2d 900, 904 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 843
(1979).
106. Note, supra note 46, at 1416.
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counsel on retrial. 10 7 If a prosecutor moonlighted as a defense attorney in the same judicial circuit where he worked as a prosecutor, the public might fear he would use "his influence and position
to extract favorable treatment for such defendants in order to further the success of his private professional career."1 08 Even if he
moved his part-time defense activities to another county, he might
"justifiably raise serious doubts as to the propriety of such action
by the public."' 1 9 Even if the former government attorney is not
doing anything improper, "[tihe appearance of conflict is as dangerous to public confidence in the administration of justice as true
conflict itself. Justice must not only be done; justice must also be
seen to be done." 1 0
While there is a need to maintain public confidence, there is also
a danger of overreacting. It is doubtful that public confidence in
the integrity of judicial procedures can be founded on disqualification for "an unethical conflict of interest where none exists or can
exist, with the result of depriving a criminal accused of the services
of an attorney in whom he reposes confidence.""'
Moreover, public suspicion of the criminal justice system conversely might be aroused if prosecutors routinely seek disqualification of the defense attorney. The public might begin to wonder if
there is some evidence of innocence the prosecution is trying to
conceal. If the former prosecutor is now employed by a legal aid or
defender organization, and ethical rules result in denial of effective
representation to an indigent defendant, danger of public disillusionment is even greater. " 2

IV.

THE DYNAMICS OF THE DISQUALIFICATION PROCESS

A.

The Trial Judge's Role

The judiciary has been criticized as taking a "piecemeal and
somewhat contradictory" approach to attorney disqualification.I s
Perhaps this deficiency is due to the lack of clear guidelines for
107. Osborn v. District Court, 619 P.2d 41, 45 (Colo. 1980).
108. People v. Rhodes, 115 Cal. Rptr, 235, 239 (1974).
109. Myers v. State, 296 So. 2d 695, 699 (Miss. 1974).
110. Cutler, Conflicts of Interest, 30 EMORY L.J. 1015, 1020 (1981).
111. State v. Lucarello, 343 A.2d 465, 471 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.) (Morgan, J., dissenting), affd, 350 A.2d 226 (N.J. 1975).
112. Aronson, Conflict of Interest, 52 WASH. L. REV. 807, 856-57 (1977).
113. Comment, Disqualificationof Counsel: Adverse Interests and Revolving Doors, 81
COLUM. L. REv. 199, 199 (1981).
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trial courts to follow. Unless the trial judge knows or should know
that a particular conflict exists, he is under no duty to initiate an
inquiry. 1 Generally, a trial judge will not have knowledge of the
defense attorney's prior involvement on the state's side absent a
motion by the prosecutor.
Furthermore, in a criminal prosecution, disqualification may be
inappropriate absent a motion by the former client even if the
judge does have independent suspicions of conflict, because of the
added implication of the defendant's constitutional rights." 6 On
the other hand, as noted previously, the defendant's right to select
his own counsel is not unbridled." 6 It "is specifically limited by the
trial court's power and responsibility to regulate the conduct of attorneys who practice before it."" 7 The trial judge is the ultimate
guardian of a defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel." 8
Because of this positive duty, he may not be in a practical position
to wait until the accused or an attorney raises the issue of conflict.
The "Constitution also protects defendants whose attorneys fail to
consider, or choose to ignore, potential conflict problems."' 1 9 Once
the possibility of conflict is known, the court has a duty to inquire
further. 10 Defendants who retain their own counsel are entitled to
no less protection than those for whom the state appoints
counsel.''
While there is consensus as to a trial judge's power to disqualify,
there is disagreement among jurisdictions as to what must be
shown before disqualification is proper. Due to the trial court's
broad discretion, even a violation of the Code will not automatically result in disqualification of an attorney. 2 ' Representative of
the strict approach, New Jersey disqualifies without requiring formal proof and findings, positing that the business of the trial
courts is to "provide the facilities for the determination of questions of guilt or innocence, not to determine the ethical propriety
114. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 347 (1980).
115. United States v. Cunningham, 672 F.2d 1064, 1072 (2d Cir. 1982).
116. See supra text accompanying notes 67-75.
117. United States v. Kitchin, 592 F.2d 900, 903 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 843
(1979).
118. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 71 (1942).
119. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 351 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring).
120. Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 272 (1981).
121. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 344-45.
122. Note, Armstrong v. McAlpin: Screening Former Government Attorneys, 2 PACE L.
REV. 49, 50 n.6 (1982).
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of a particular retainer.""2' The Fifth District Court of Appeal of
Florida suggests Florida would allow disqualification if sufficient
facts are alleged that, if true, would warrant removal.'2 " The Second Circuit, however, disqualifies only if the misconduct would affect the outcome of the trial. Otherwise, "conventional disciplinary
machinery" is used to sanction the attorney, with the organized
26
bar assuming the burden of making it an effective deterrent.
Although a defendant has a right to be represented by "counsel
free of any conflicts of interest, this is a right which can be
waived. . . . Thus, [another] sensitive inquiry must be made after
a [trial] court concludes that a conflict exists or is likely to develop."' 26 Some jurisdictions take the view that, while the court
has a responsibility to ensure that the defendant makes a knowing
and intelligent waiver of his right to conflict-free counsel, once the
defendant accepts the potential threat to his interests his ultimate
choice should be honored.1 2 7 Under this view, the court does not
have the power to unilaterally obstruct the defendant's decision 2 8
since he can choose to take a "calculated risk"' 29 and waive his
right to conflict-free counsel.'3 0 Others feel that the court's goal
should be to foreclose as many opportunities as possible for defendants to claim that due to conflicts of interest, their assistance of
counsel was ineffective.' 3 '
Trial courts must be sensitive to the possibility that if the defendant is allowed to proceed with the former prosecutor as his counsel, he may use this as a strategy to gain reversal. A defendant
content with his counsel before trial may, upon conviction, allege
that the representation constituted a conflict that resulted in denial of his rights. The best approach is to complement each view
with the other. Once the defendant makes a knowing and intelligent waiver, he should be forced to accept the consequences of his
actions on appeal.
123. State v. Jaquindo, 350 A.2d 252, 256 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.) (Morgan, J., concurring and dissenting), aff'd sub nom. State v. Rizzo, 350 A.2d 225 (N.J. 1975).
124. Pantori, Inc. v. Stephenson, 384 So. 2d 1357, 1359 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
125. Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1247-48 (2d Cir. 1979) (Mansfield, J.,
concurring).
126. United States v. Phillips, 699 F.2d 798, 803 (6th Cir. 1983).
127. United States v. Mahar, 550 F.2d 1005, 1010 (5th Cir. 1977).
128. In re Taylor, 567 F.2d 1183, 1191 (2d Cir. 1977).
129. Unified Sewerage Agency v. Jelco, Inc., 646 F.2d 1339, 1349-50 (9th Cir. 1981).
130. DeArce v. State, 405 So. 2d 283, 285 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
131. State ex rel Starnes v. Erickson, 186 N.W.2d 502, 507 (S.D.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
845 (1971).
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B.

Appeal of DisqualificationOrders

1. Interlocutory Appeal
In Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.,132 the United
States Supreme Court established a test to determine when an interlocutory appeal of a trial court's decision would be allowed. The
lower court's decision must "finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself
to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole
case is adjudicated.' 3 The Supreme Court applied the Cohen test
in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord,"4 and held that orders
denying motions to disqualify counsel in a civil case are not appealable as final decisions.1 35 However, the Court made clear that
it was not expressing an opinion on whether an order granting a
motion to disqualify in a civil or criminal case, or an order denying
a motion to disqualify in a criminal case, would be immediately
appealable." 6
The vast majority of courts have held that an order disqualifying
37
a defense counsel in a criminal case is immediately appealable.1
Some courts have reviewed disqualification orders without directly
ruling on the appealability issue." 8' Allowing appeal acknowledges
that deferring review may jeopardize the defendant's case by
prohibiting representation by counsel of his choice. Furthermore,
from the time of disqualification the defendant's case is affected by
the loss of an attorney in whom he had confidence. 139 The trial is
not disrupted by the appeal since it must be stayed anyway to give
the defendant an opportunity to obtain new counsel. 40 Also, "disqualification often impairs the reputation of the disqualified firm
132. 337 U.S. 541 (1949) (construing 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976)).
133. Id. at 546.
134. 449 U.S. 368 (1981).
135. Id. at 379.
136. Id. at 372 n.8.
137. E.g., United States v. Phillips, 699 F.2d 798, 800 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Agosto, 675 F.2d 965, 968 n.1 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 77 (1982); United States v.
Dolan, 570 F.2d 1177, 1180 (3d Cir. 1978); United States v. Garcia, 517 F.2d 272, 275 (5th
Cir. 1975); DeArce v. State, 405 So. 2d 283, 284 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
138. United States v. Duklewski, 567 F.2d 255 (4th Cir. 1977); United States v. ArmedoSarmiento, 524 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1975).
139. Phillips,699 F.2d at 802.
140. Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 440-41 (2d Cir.), vacated on other grounds,
449 U.S. 1106 (1980).
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or attorney, and this injury may never be corrected on appeal if
the party is satisfied with the performance of his new counsel."14' 1
The Ninth Circuit appears to be alone in its view that disqualification is not addressable in an interlocutory appeal. 1 42 The rationale is that civil disqualification orders are not appealable before
final resolution of the case, and the addition of the sixth amendment element does not warrant treating a criminal case differently.' " However, the circuit does allow a "really" exceptional case
to be heard before conviction by way of a petition for writ of
mandamus."4
If a motion for disqualification is denied in a criminal case, the
government should be able to appeal immediately; once a judgment has been rendered, the disqualification either cannot or will
not be reviewed. Even the Ninth Circuit has recognized that the
double jeopardy rule precludes retrial on the basis that the disqualification order was erroneous. 4 5 Therefore, after an acquittal,
the erroneous denial would be irreparable. Conversely, if the prosecutor were to secure a conviction, there would be no reason to appeal the denial.
2.

Standard of Review

Appellate courts have held that since the disqualification of an
attorney is within the trial court's discretion, its ruling should only
46
be overturned in a civil case if an abuse of discretion is shown.
Some courts apply this standard in criminal cases when the motion
to disqualify has been granted. 47 Others have held that "the
'abuse of discretion' standard is simply too deferential where such
a fundamental constitutional right is affected,"' "1 8 and that the
"clearly erroneous" test should be applied to issues of fact. 1 49
141. Id. at 441.
142. United States v. Greger, 657 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1891
(1983).
143. Id. at 1112.
144. Id. at 1114.
145. Id. at 1113 n.1.
146. E.g., Unified Sewerage Agency v. Jelco, Inc., 646 F.2d 1339, 1351 (9th Cir. 1981);
Central Milk Producers Co-op. v. Sentry Food Stores, Inc., 573 F.2d 988, 991 (8th Cir. 1978);
W.T. Grant Co. v. Haines, 531 F.2d 671, 676 (2d Cir. 1976).
147. In re Gopman, 531 F.2d 262, 266 (5th Cir. 1976).
148. United States v. Hobson, 672 F.2d 825, 827 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 208
(1982).
149. E.g., id. at 827-28; see also Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 810
(5th Cir. 1976).

ATTORNEY DISQUALIFICATION

19841

If the defendant is not allowed to appeal until after conviction,
the question of whether prejudice must be shown arises. The Ninth
Circuit recognizes that if the defendant had to show "he was convicted because of new counsel, the burden would be insurmountable, and the disqualification 'effectively unreviewable on appeal.' "15 Therefore, prejudice is presumed if the disqualification is
found to be erroneous. 15 1 Furthermore, the right to counsel is considered by some152to be so basic to a fair trial that its denial is never
harmless error.

The opposite problem is posed when the defendant's appeal is
based on his being allowed to proceed with a former prosecutor as
counsel. Under these circumstances, the Illinois Supreme Court
makes distinctions based on the amount of involvement that the
attorney had with the case while a prosecutor. In People v. Newberry, " the court found no inherent prejudice although the defendant's appointed attorney had been employed as a prosecutor
when the defendant was indicted.154 Four years later, the same
court reversed a defendant's conviction in People v. Kester'55 when
the appointed attorney had been personally involved in prosecuting the defendant in the same case. The court found that, absent a
waiver of the right to conflict-free counsel, the possibility that subtle influences would make the former prosecutor reluctant to attack the actions of the prosecutor's office or willing to persuade his
client to plead guilty to avoid confrontation with his former colleagues is sufficient to imply prejudice.'
C.

Vicarious Disqualification

Once a trial judge has decided to disqualify a former prosecutor,
he still must face one final issue. He must decide whether to disqualify the firm with which the former prosecutor is associated, as
the government is entitled to vicarious disqualifications when its
57
secrets and confidences are threatened.1

Interestingly, New Jersey does not require vicarious disqualifica150. United States v. Greger, 657 F.2d 1109, 1113 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
1891 (1983).

151. Id.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

United States v. Laura, 607 F.2d 52, 58 (3d Cir. 1979).
302 N.E.2d 34 (IlM.1973).
Id. at 36.
361 N.E.2d 569 (Il. 1977).
Id. at 571-72.
United States v. Uzzi, 549 F. Supp. 979, 984 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
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tion during the six month period of personal disqualification it
would impose on every former assistant prosecutor.1 58 However,
the state requires disqualification of the firm if the affiliated attorney had any involvement in the matter sufficient to disqualify him
under the state's guidelines. This standard comports with the restrictive view. 59
Another line of thought is that a strict prophylactic application
of vicarious disqualification would "virtually halt the revolving
door by making law firms extremely reluctant to hire former government attorneys. 1 60 If the former prosecutor infected "all the
members of any firm he joined with all his own personal disqualifications, he would take on the status of a Typhoid Mary, and be
reduced to sole practice under the most unfavorable conditions.""16
Instead of vicarious disqualification, this more flexible approach
would allow the firm to show the former prosecutor had been and
would be insulated from the case.1 62
V.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Ideally, a lawyer's word that he has not violated the confidences
of a former client would be an adequate safeguard against impropriety. Unfortunately for the trial judge who must decide the disqualification question, the attorney's bond is not enough. In a
criminal case the added element of the defendant's sixth amendment rights necessitates a stricter standard for the disqualification
of a former government attorney. A defendant's choice of counsel
should be honored whenever possible.
It is recommended that whenever the trial judge is aware or is
informed that the defense counsel is a former prosecutor, he perform a three-step process. First, he should ascertain whether the
attorney was so intimately involved in the investigation or prosecution of the case that he was privy to what would be classified as the
prosecutor's work product or other evidence not available to the
defense through formal discovery."6 3 Access to files in the prosecu158. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
159. In re Advisory Opinion on Professional Ethics No. 361, 390 A.2d 118, 121-22 (N.J.
1978).
160. Note, supra note 46, at 1440.
161. Kesselhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 791, 793 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
162. Id. (Safeguards in Kesselhaut included: attorney had no connection with case in
private practice; all other attorneys were prohibited from discussing the case with him and
were to prevent any case documents from reaching him; files were kept in a locked file
cabinet and keys were kept by the partners.)
163. See supra notes 87-93 and accompanying text.
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tor's office should not warrant automatic disqualification in every
case. Canon 9's "appearance of impropriety" standard should not
be used to justify disqualification absent a showing that it would
also be proper to disqualify under DR 9-101(B).
Only if the trial judge finds that the former prosecutor's client
has gained an advantage through the use of information, either
contained in the prosecutor's files or through the prosecutor's investigation, should he move to the second step of weighing the
competing interests. These include the defendant's right to chosen
counsel; the individual attorney's interest in safeguarding his professional mobility; society's interest in securing public confidence
in the legal system; and, relatedly, the legal system's interest in
securing those rights, privileges and values found necessary to our
adversarial system.'" The judge should allow the attorney to proceed unless there is at least some possibility that the trial will be
tainted by his representation.
If disqualification is found to be the only means adequate to
safeguard the trial process, the court still should be reluctant to
impose vicarious disqualification. Only when screening procedures
are inadequate should the attorney's entire firm be disqualified. 6 5
If the former prosecutor is not disqualified, the court should
move on to the third step. Before a defendant is allowed to proceed with the former prosecutor by his side, the court should ensure that the defendant makes a knowing and intelligent waiver of
any conflict that is present. If the defendant elects to do so, his
decision should be honored.
Both sides should'be permitted to use the interlocutory appeal
process. A defendant deprived of his choice of counsel on a motion
by those prosecuting him should not have to wait and utilize postconviction remedies. The prosecutor cannot wait and still have a
remedy. 160
Appellate courts should use the "clearly erroneous" test due to
the importance of the constitutional right at issue. The facts in
these types of motions to disqualify will seldom be disputed. The
conclusion that the trial judge reaches is entitled to some deference but "abuse of discretion" is not a stringent enough standard
when the defendant has been stripped of his attorney.
Trial courts are placed in an unenviable position when a former
164.
165.
166.

See Formal Op. 342, supra note 11, in 62 A.B.A.J. at 518.
See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
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prosecutor accepts a retainer in a criminal case in which he was
substantially and personally involved while with the prosecutor's
office. The bar should not be allowed to shift its responsibility to
the courts. The bar should be the vehicle for controlling and sanctioning an attorney's behavior whenever possible. Traditional disciplinary machinery is the proper way to deal with an attorney's
failure to avoid the appearance of impropriety through representation of a defendant in a matter in which he had substantial responsibility while with the government. By utilization of this resource,
in most cases, the defendant's chosen counsel can be retained and
professional ethics can be vigorously maintained.

